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Abstract
A responsive computing system

then an error has occurred. Since error detection is
conceptually the most difficult problem in fault tolerance, this quantification of error detection has proved
quite powerful - a system need not rely on hardware or
software confidence to avoid or detect errors; the specification provides the absolute truth of correctness.
The notion of “the program satisfies the specification” is a powerful abstraction as it immediately draws
the researcher into the area of formal logic t o express
the specification. This, coupled with an existing set of
axioms and inference rules for a particular (programming) language provides the appropriate level of representation for run-time error checking. Essentially,
the same tools used in program verification are immediately applicable t o run-time assurance, namely
execution of the specification in either a predicate or
temporal framework.
Our work provides the run-time semantics t o carry
out such execution of specifications, possibly in the
presense of failed hardware and/or software. Thus, the
approach taken here adopts a formalized specification
language together with a mechanized support tool t o
allow detection of certain types of errors and faults.
Methodology. There are three steps involved in
this approach of ensuring a system’s specification at
run-time:

a hybrid of realtime, distributed and fault-tolerant systems. In such a
system, severe consequences can occur if the run-tame
behavior does not conform to the expected behavior or
specifications. In this paper, we present a formal approach t o ensure satisfaction of the specifications in
the operational environment as follows. First we speci f y behavior of the systems using Interval Temporal
Logzc (ITL). Next we give algorithms for trace checking of programs in such systems. Finally, we present
a fully distributed run-time evaluation system which
causally orders the events of the system during its execution and checks this run-time behavior against its
I T L specification. The approach is illustrated using a
train-set example.

1
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Introduction
A responsive computing system [I] is one which is

required to respond to internal programs or external
inputs in a timely, dependable and predictable manner. These systems are a hybrid of real-time, distributed and fault-tolerant systems. In such a system,
any failure can cause a catastrophe, and hence, it, is
very important t o ensure that run-time behavior of
the system conforms to its expected behavior (specification).
The specification of such critical systems can be
rigorously represented using formal methods of logic.
Formal methods are the use of mathematical techniques in the design and analysis of computer hardware and software. One of the many advantages of
using formal methods is that when a property is obtained, it comes from certainty and not from doubtful
or approximate inferences.
Conceptualization. The goal of our work is t o find
ways t o execute program specifications along with
the actual program’s execution for purposes of runtime assurance - namely for error detection within the
scope of fault tolerance. If the execution of the program does not satisfy the specification at run time,

1. Specify properties of a responsive computing system using Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) formulas,
2. build a run-time event history, the causal structure of the execution, and
3. evaluate properties of the system according t o the
event histories.

At step 1, the logic ITL was developed t o specify
behavior of a responsive computing system. In particular, we use interval formulas and responsiveness
assertzons to denote properties of a system. These
formulas denoting system specifications are expected
to hold within bounded intervals. Thus, an error has
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of formulas. The work of [5] embeds system constraints into programs and examines them at run-time.
However, they use a centralized monitor to obtain an
execution history, while our method does not require
monitors to compute histories.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the logic ITL. Section 3 describes
the notion of an event, our model of distributed computation, and other definitions t o be used in this paper. In Section 4,we describe a timestamping scheme,
vector clocks, to order events in a collected history.
Next, we present an algorithm, Compute History, to
construct event histories and then give a decision procedure for the determination of satisfaction of ITL formulas at run-time. Section 5 presents a train set example to illustrate the application of operational evaluation. Section 6 concludes this paper.

occurred if the system does not satisfy these formulas
within bounded intervals.
At step 2, we give algorithms to obtain a run-time
history or to build the causal structure of the execution. The run-time history of a (distributed) system
can be obtained by collecting and partially ordering
events’ occurring in the system’.
At step 3, we apply a decision procedure, 11, to
check whether the collected event history satisfies the
specification of a system derived at step 1. Since an
event history is a sequence of events occurring in a
system, it represents a process’ observation of all the
processes during execution. This history can be utilized to do evaluation of assertions at run-time. The
evaluation is a simple matter, then, to break down the
temporal assertions into predicate calculus expressions
quantified over this history sequence3. Thus. this approach uses the ITL formulas to detect errors. If the
run-time behavior violates its specification denoted
by ITL formulas, then appropriate actions should be
taken.
For example, one way to avoid cars and trains occupying a crossing at the same time is to lower a gate
before a train arrives on the crossing [2]. An ITL
formula (step 1) for this situation can be used to represent the timing constraints of the system. Knowing
how long it takes to lower the gate, and the minimum
time that can elapse between a train passing a sensor and reaching the crossing, we can deduce timing
constraints on the gate controller. At run-time, then,
we collect the events of the train passing the sensor
(step 2) and can check if the gate controller violates
the ITL specifications denoting these constraints (step
3). If yes, actions should be taken to react to the error.
In our previous work, we used a decision procedure to check satisfaction of liveness assertions in
the operational environment [3]. A liveness assertion
(4 + EF+) denotes that when a program starts from
a state satisfying assertion 4, eventually it will get
to a state satisfying assertion $J. This kind of assertion can not describe properties that must hold within
bounded intervals and hence is not suitable for responsive computing systems. Thus, this paper focuses
on constructing a decision procedure II to check, at
run-time, satisfaction of system specifications within
bounded intervals of time.
In related work, for the determination of satisfaction of formulas, [4] translates temporal logic formulas into finite automata. In contrast, we establish a
correspondence between states and events in the collected event history and examine the history against
t,he specification for the determination of satisfaction

2

Interval Temporal Logic

This section presents a logic, Interval Temporal
Logic (ITL), for the responsive computing systems.
The logic ITL is an extension of Interleaving Set Temporal Logic (ISTL) [6]. It adopts a partial order semantics which considers a distributed computation as
a set of partially ordered events. Hence, this logic
ITL can capture temporal and distributed aspects of
the responsive systems that we are modeling.
With the logic ISTL, one can not reason about a
property within a bounded interval of time, which motivates the development of the ITL for the responsive
computing systems. There are other temporal logics
for real-time systems for example [7, 8, 9, lo]. The
logic [8] does not have a proof system for reasoning
about a system. [9] is designed for reasoning about
hardware, while we aim at a logic which can reason
about a distributed real-time system. In our approach,
the specification of a system will be tested to detect
errors at run-time. So we need to build a mechanized
support tool for the logic. For efficiency consideration, we built the logic ITL which has a small set of
syntactic forms and includes only the inference rules
necessary for the run-time evaluation. Hence we do
not adopt the logic [9, lo].
Due to the page limits, we only present two types of
formulas, znterval formulas and responsive assertzons.
The reader may refer to [11] for the syntax and semantics of the logic. Informally, an znterval is of the form
b] or [p, q1 and an znterval formula is of the form b]qi
or [P,q]4 where p , q and 4 are any formulas of ITL.
An interval formula b]4 ([p,q]q5) is true over a state
sequence n , iff the interval b] (b,q]) cannot be found
or the formula 4 holds on every interval b] (b,q]).
Thus, there are two ways to conclude that an interval formula holds. This would cause a problem in the
composition of interval formulas to create a ’71eads-to”
property. Thus, the following responszveness assertion
is proposed.

]An event can be modeled as execution of one statement or
a set of statements.
2Note that we consader neither the undedyzng scheddang
strategaes nor predcet whach branches O T statements will be executed at run-tame.
3 f ~ example,
r
the temporal expression “now and always p ,
in predicate calculus becomes Vz in history H (of events H ,
indexed by i ) such that H ,
p . A program to check this
temporal expression over a collected history, H , loops through
H checking that each event H , satisfies p

Definition 2.1 A responszveness assertzon 2s a path
formula of the form (b14 [P, qIE&J), where P,q14j
and 4 are formulas of I T L .
+

A responsiveness assertion (b]4 -+ b,q]EF$) ‘s
true over a state sequence n, iff the following holds: if
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Definition 3.4 A history of a program P is a pair
h =< J , v > where J is the initial interpretation and
v = a1, a2, . . . , a, is a sequence of events of the program in the causal relation .+ order.

r$ holds whenever p holds, then t,!J will occur at any q
following p . This assertion ensures bounded response
of t,!J to [p]4 within the interrals [p, q].
The above formulas are t o be applied t o a run-time
system to check if a system does what it is supposed.
The following notation and background are necessary
t o understand the proposed algorithms for evaluating
the ITL formulas at run-time.

3

Throughout the paper, we will use the letter J in a
history (e.g., h =< J , v >) to denote an initial state.

Definition 3.5 Let A be a collection of events of a
program. Given an initial state J and two sequences
of events v and w ( v , w E A*), two histories h =<
J , v > and h‘ =< J , w > are equivalent, i f there exist
histories < J , v1 >, < J , v2 >, . . . ,< J , v, > with 01 =
v and v, = w and for each 1 5 i < n , there exist a f ,
,d and x , y E A*, such that vi = xapy,vi+l = xpay.
In other words, vi and vi+l only differ b y the order of
adjacent symbols which are independent according t o
the causal relation + of Definition 3.2 [6].

Background

A distributed program consists of n processes,
P I ,P2, . . . , P,, which cooperate t o perform a computation. Each process resides on a unique processor.
The mapping between processors and processes is oneto-one. There are no global clocks, and processes
must communicate via message-passing to exchange
information. Thus, the events occurring within a process can be totally ordered according t o its processor’s
clock while events occurring within other processors
cannot.
There are three types of operations, internal (local) operations, send operations, and receive operations. A send (receive) event of a processor includes
execution of a sequence of local operations followed
by a send (receive) operation in that processor. Send
or receive events are referred t o as externally observable events. The externally observable events can be
partially-ordered by any processor whereas internal
events of a processor are non-observable by other processors.
The following definitions are necessary before the
presentation of the algorithms.

Definition 3.6 A trace is an equivalence class of
histories. denoted bu TJ. wl where J is an initial state
and < J,’w > as some member of the equivalence class
IJ, ~1([1311[61b
V

L

’

J

Definition 3.7 Let a set

v h k be a processor PLs
collection of events including processor P i s (local)
events, and those it observes (processor P, communicates with processor Pk about its local events). This
set v h k denotes processor PLs history. Also, processor Pk ’s knowledge or view about system execution
is based on the events an its history v i k .

azontal lane descrabes one process behavaor, and the
horazontal darectaon of each lane denotes tame whach
ancreases from left to raght. Message exchanges are
shown b y darected lanes.

Notice that the history h =< J , v > is a complete
history of a program, which contains events of the
whole execution of the program, while the history v h ,
of processor Pk is a partial history or a collection of
events observed or executed by processor Pk during
execution.

Definition 3.1 Event executaon an a program forms
an arreflexave partaal order(denoted b y +) on the

Definition 3.8 Let ek,l, ek,2, . . . , ek,, be the first,
second, . . ., nth observable

Notation 3.1 Event executaon an a dzstrzbuted program as represented b y a daagram, where each hor-

events whach occur an the program.

(send or receive) events of processor Pk. A n event
ek,m is the mth event ofprocessor 4 .

Definition 3.2 Event e precedes event f an an executaon, a.e., e +- f , af and only af any one of the followang
condataons holds [12] I

4

e and f are events of the same process, and e
occurs before f ,
e is a send event, and f is the corresponding receive event, or
there exists an event g , such that e

s-ff.

.+

Event Histories

In this section, we present algorithms for the construction of event histories t o represent system execution. These histories will be used t o evaluate system
specifications written in ITL formulas (described in
the following section). First, we gives a brief introduction to events, our model of distributed computation
and the notation and definitions used in this chapter.

g , and

4.1

Ordering Events

Recall that a history v h k is a collection of events
observed or performed by processor Pk (process) during execution. Among these events, some are causally
related, while some are not causally related (independent). Thus, a time-stamping scheme is necessary
to decide causality of any two events in a history.
What we would like is a clock scheme that imposes
no arbitrary orderings on any two events which are

Note that we assume that a system has been verified
t o be deadlock-free.

Definition 3.3 Two events e , f are causally related if either e + f or f + e holds. If neither
e -+ f nor f + e holds, then e and f are considered

as concurrent or independent events.
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not, originally causally related. Thus, vector clocks
(114, 15, IS]) are chosen to determine causality between any two events.
Vector Clock Scheme. Let Cibe the vector clock
of process Pi, and let Ci denote the clock value after
the execution of event ea,k. On sending a message, a
process Pi timestamps the message by appending the
clock value to it. When process Pi executes an event
e , ,the following operations are performed on its clock
C”

important to have correct histories. The following definitions show that a history is correct with respect to
the history h =< J , v > iff its continuation (see Definition 4.2) is a member of the equivalence class of
history h.

Operation 1: for each event e , Pi increments its

Definition 4.3 For a processor 4 , i f s (run-time)
history v h k =< J , w > i s correct with respect t o the
history h =< J , v >, if and only if the following con-

clock Cion the ith component of the vector, i.e.,
Ci[i]= Ca[[i] 1,where Ca[i]denotes the ith component of vector C’.

+

Definition 4.2 A history h =< J , w > i s a continuation of a history h‘ =< J , w‘ >, if ( 1 ) for every
event e i n h‘, e is also i n h, and ( 2 ) causality i n h’
implies causality i n h.

dition holds:
there exists a history (Vj,)’,a continuation
of vh,, such that (Vh,)’i s a m e m b e r of the
equavalence class of < J , v >, i.e.,
(Vh,)’=< J , W >E [ J ,U ] .

Operation 2: for a receive event e with a vector
timestamp T, Vm, Ca[m]=
m a z ( C i [ [ m ] T[m]),
,
where Ci[m]andT[m] denote
the mthcomponents of vectors Ci and T , respectively. In other words, the value of each component of vector Ci is obtained by taking the maximal value ,from the corresponding components of
vectors C8 and T .

The following definition describes the mechanism of
deciding causality of any two time-stamped events.

Definition 4.1 Given t w o t i m e s t a m p s (vectors) C;,
C/ for events ei,k and e j , l , respectively, the relation
(ei,k + e j , l ) holds, i$

(vr,Ci[r]5 C { [ T ] ) / \ ( ~ S , ~ ~
<[cS{ ][ s ] ) .
In ot,her words, event ei,k occurs before event e j , l ,
if and only if all the components of Ci are less than
or equal to the corresponding components of C{ and
there exists a component of C i which is strictly less
than that of C;.

4.2

Correct Histories and Algorithms

In Section 3.2, we described vector clock timestamping which can be used by a processor in a distributed system to order events from different processors. The purpose of this subsection is to show that
a processor Pk can construct an execution history vhk
without a global clock and without any monitors. We
begin with the definition of correct histories and then
present an algorithm Compute History, which allows a
processor Pk to construct an execution history vh, by
collecting events occurring in the system. Finally, the
history vhk constructed according to the algorithm is
shown to be correct.
Correct Histories. Recall that a history Vh, is a collection of events executed or observed by processor Pk
during execution, and it is processor 4 ’ s view of all
the externally-observable events performed by other
processors involved in a computation. The objective
is to utilize this history to check for a violation of a
program’s specification at run-time. Thus, it is very

Notice that, in Definition 4.3, histories h and (Vh,)’
are equivalent, where h is a correct and complete history of a program and (Vh,)’is a history resulting
from extending the history Vh,. The following proposition shows that a history v h k i s correct, if and only
if causakty among events i n vh, as preserved during
execution.

Proposition 4.1 For a processor 4 , i t s history

Vh, =< J , w > as correct with respect t o a history

=< J , v > i f and only zf for events i n v h k , causali t y i n vh, U Causality i n h, i . e . , causality i n \%, i s
preserved during execution.
h

Proof: (if part) If the history Vj, is correct, then
there exists a continuation (Vh,)’=< J , w’ > of Vh,,
and < J , w’ > E [ J ,U ] . In other words, < J , w’ > and
< J , v > only differ by the order of independent operations, which implies v and w’ have the same orderings
for those causally related events, i.e., causality in h e
causality in (Vh,)’.Since (Vh,)’is a continuation of
v h k , for the events in v h k , causality in v h k U causality
in Vh,)’. Therefore, for the events in vh,, causality
in U causality in Vh,. This implies that causality
in Vh, is preserved during execution.
(only-if part) From assumption for events in Vhk,
causality in vh,
causality in h, we know that h is a
continuation of Vh, . Then, there exists a continuation
(Vh,)’= h of vh,, such that (Vh,)’and h are equivalent. By Definition 4.3, the history v h k is correct with
respect to the history h. 0

i

4.3

Computing Histories in a Non-Faulty
Environment

In this subsection, we present an algorithm which
allows a processor Pk in a distributed system t o collect
events into a history vh, , limiting ourselves, for now,
to a non-faulty environment [17]. Later, it will be
shown that these histories can be utilized to detect a
violation of processors’ run-time behaviors.
Main idea. A processor Pk relies on communications to find out events that have occurred in other
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A run-time history v h , of processor Pi is computed as
follows. During a communication, processors Pi and
P’ exchange their respective histories Vh,and vh, . After the exchange, both processors incorporate the received history into their own histories. The following
shows that processor Pi incorporates vh, into its history vh,.

e2.2

Figure 1: Message Passing and Event Contents
processes, and t o collect these events into its history
v h k . Thus, whenever there as a communication, processes exchange their latest observations (histories) of
event occurrences in the system4. After the exchange,
processors incorporate the received histories into their
own histories. Through the exchanges of histories, every processor can obtain a view of the execution of all
the other processors in the system.
Now, we describe the contents of events, the relevant information for processors t o compute their histories. Then, examples are given t o illustrate how
processors exchange their histories (observations) , followed by the algorithm Compute History.

Figure 2: Algorithm Compute History for processor Pi

Definition 4.5 Given an event e , the incorporation
of e into a history vh, =< J , a1a2. . .a, > of processor P; as to insert e into the history Vh;,such that the
new history v h , =< J , a1 ’ . . ( Y k - l e ( Y k . . . an > satisfies the following conditions:
1. for each m < k , e ft a m ,
i.e., e does not cause any am(1
2. e

Definition 4.4 Let a tuple tl = (processor,war =
va1,time) denote a timestamped local operation. Let a

-+

(Yk,

i.e., e causes

5 m < 1).

(Yk.

Therefore, in the new sequence
((Y~...(Y~-I~(Y~.-.Q
e , does
),
not cause any event
preceding e (i.e., events a1 . . . ( Y k - l ) , and e causes its
next event (i.e., event ( Y k ) . Notice that there are many
ways of incorporating events into a processor’s history, since events are timestamped by vector clocks
and they form a partial ordering instead of a total ordering. However, it is important that during execution, causality in a collected history v h , is preserved,
and at termination, history vh, is a member of the
equivalence class of the history h =< J , ZI >. The following describes an incorporation of one history into
another.

tuple t2 = (processorl,processor2, sendlreceive,
t i m e ) represent a timestamped send/receive operation
of processorl, where processor2 is the corresponding
communicating processor. A send/receive event e is
denoted b y ( t l , t l , . . .,t l , t2).
From the above, a tuple can represent a
timestamped local operation or a time-stamped
sendlreceive operation, and a sendlreceive event e
contains information of local operations followed by
an send/receive operation, i.e., ( t l , t l , . . . , t l , t 2 ). For
example, in Figure 1, there are two send events, el 1
and e 1 , 2 . The contents of these two events are as follows.

Definition 4.6 Given two histories vh, and Vha,a
function fi(vh, ,Vha)returns a history v h z , such that
for each event e of v h l , if e as not in Vh,, then, using
Definition 4.5, incorporate e into v h a .
The following example illustrates exchanges of observations (histories) and incorporations of histories.
The examples of communicating histories are in [18].

Events e1,l shows that at time [1,0] the value of 1:
in processor PI is 1, and PI sent a message to Pz at
time [2,0]. Likewise, event e1,2 shows that at time
[3,0] the value of z in processor PI is 5 , and PI sent
a message t o P2 at time [4,0]. Here, the result of a
local operation, z = 1, is considered as part of the
next (observable) event e 1 , l . Similarly, the result of
a local operation, 1: = 5 , is considered as part of the
next (observable) event e1,2.
Based on this example, then, how does processor P2
incorporate the received events into its history v h a ?
The following describes the incorporation of an event
into a history.

ASAlgorithm for a Non-Faulty Environment.
sume that there are n isolated Drocessors which can
communicate only by two-party messages. Figure 2
presents Algorithm Compute History, which computes
a history of processor Pi in a non-faulty environment.
In this algorithm, processors Pi and Pj exchange their
respective histories vh, and vh, during a communication. Then, processors Pa computes its new history
v h , by incorporating events in vh, into vh, (step 1).
Finally, processor Pi updates its clock (step 2).

Theorem 4.1 The history,

v h , , built b y the algorithm Compute History of Figure 2, is correct in a
non-faulty environment.

4Note that, for efficiency considerations, only those events
which have not been communicated previously need to be sent.
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The above formula can be derived from Progress
Rule.
First, we apply Progress Rule t o derive a formula *, which describes sensor failure
on two consecutive sections as follows.
To derive \E = [ y ] P t r a i n ( x )--+ [ T ~ ’ , T ~ ] E F ( o n ( A
c,x)
+ens(c, P t r a i n ( z ) ) ) , the following premises must
hold:

Train Set Example

In this section, we illustrate the proposed approach
using a train set example ([19], [20]). This is an example of a safety-critical system which involves interactions between controllers and physical processes. In
Figure 3, the physical process consists of circuits, C,
and C,, and trains, Tpand T, . The circuits are divided
into sections and the crossing section (CC) is where
the circuits intersect. Each section has a sensor, while
for each train there is an actuator that can stop the
t,rain within any section. For such a safety-critical system, accidents will occur if the physical specification
and the logical specification are not met. We can then
check whether the physical specification denoted by a
run-time history Vh,satisfies the logical specification
denoted by ITL formulas.

[qqPtrain( x)

+

[Tr,T:]EF(on(c,z) A y S e n s ( c ,Ptrain(z)))
[T;]Ptrain(z)
[T,”,T&]EF(on(c,

-+
z) A +ens(c, P t r a i n ( x ) ) )

[T?,T&]E(on(c, z) A l S e n s ( c ,P t r a i n ( x ) ) )

5.1 Safety Constraints
In this subsection, we describes the safety constraints of the system. These constraints are t o be
embedded into the train set program t o check if the
run-time system behaves as what we expect. Figure 4
describes the state variables t o be used.

Premise (1) states that the sensor of section i fails
within the interval
, T:]. Likewise, Premise ( 2 )
states that the sensor of section i @ 1 fails within the
interval [ T : , T L ] . Premise (3) states that the forz@l
mula ( o n ( c ,z) A -Sens(c, Ptrain(x)))will hold in the
interval [ ~ , T If~ these
] . three premises hold, then
le31
according to Progress Rule, we can conclude *, the
sensor failure on two consecutive sections. Similarly,
we can conclude sensor failure on (mcsf @ 1) sections
by applying Progress Rule.

[y

Definition 5.1 Let T“ denote the current time when
train x enters section and let T f denote the point of
time immediately before T&l.

f,

Notice that addition @ and subtraction 8 on section numbers are performed modulo the number of
sections of the circuit.
SC1 (Reservation constraints): for any train, the current occupied section (Ptrain(x)) and the following
mcs f @ 1 sections must always be reserved.

SC4: if an actuator ever fails, the system must be
shut down, i.e., if an actuator is set t o stop a train
x on section i ( [ q S ] A c t ( xi)), and the train is moving
beyond section i (ET:, T&l](Ptrain(z)> i)), then the
system must be shut down.

(Vz E T T )

(Vx E Tr)(3i E S C )
[T:]Act(z,i) A [T:, T&l](Ptruin(z) > i)

[p,
T;]{Pt~~in(P
z )t r, a i n ( x ) @ 1,* . . , Ptrain(z) @
(mcsf

~

SC2 (Exclusion constraints): mutual exclusion must
be achieved for reserved sections. In other words, if
Rtruin(x) and Rtrain(y) are the sets of sections reserved, respectively, by trains x and y (x # y), then
Rtrai~z(z)
n Rtrain(y) = 0.

Proof: By Proposition 4.1, history Vh, is correct if
causality in Vj, is preserved during execution. Recall
that Vj, is processor Pis collection of events during
execution. In the algorithm, upon the receipt of history Vh, , processor P; computes its history Vh, from
function h(Vj,, Vh,),
which incorporates events of Vh,
into v h , according to Definition 4.5. Therefore, events
in Vjz are in a linear order compatible with the causal
relations -+. Also, history Vh2 is built in a non-faulty
environment. Thus, causality in v h , is preserved.
The reader may refer t o [18] for the algorithms for
the faulty environments. Next we use a train set example t o illustrate the application of operational evaluation of temporal interval formulas.

5

mcsf denotes the maximal number of consecutive sensor failure.

I)} E Rtrain(x),

---f
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[q”,
K$l]EF(Shut-Down)

train(z1 I the set of sections that are reserved bv a train z on Circuit c
I
Sens(c,i) I sensor of section i detects a train on circuit c.
I Act(z. i ) is set to stoD train z on section i .
Actlz. i )
Shut-Down Shut-Down holds when all trains must be stopped, i.e., all actuators are set.
Figure 4: The state variables

These safety constraints govern the operation of the
system - if they are ever violated, then there is an
error. In other words, for a safety constraint SC, if the
evaluation n ( v h , , SC) returns FALSE, then an error
has occurred.

5.2

process

Pt r

P,

P,

5 mins/section I 6.67% I 2.43% I 3.20%
10 mins/section I 3.46% I 1.26% I 1.67%

Results

Figure 5: The amount of overhead.

In this subsection, we examine results of performance measurement experiments on the train set example. Let Pt,, P,, P, denote processes train, circuit
and section, respectively. Also let V h t , , V h , v h , denote
respectively the histories of processes Ptr, P, and P,.
For this experiment, the trains Tp and T, of Figure 3
have the same speed. Define a round t o be the time a
train takes t o get back t o section i when starting from
section i.
Let the overhead time be the time a process takes
t o generate a run-time history Vh,, parse ITL formulas
and evaluate the formulas. In particular, this time
includes the exchanges of histories, consistency check
and incorporation of the received histories. Thus, the
percentage of overhead incurred is (overhead time /
tot a1 time).
The train-set program is implemented on a SUN
10/40 under Solaris. Consider the cases where it takes
1, 5 and 10 minutes for a train to traverse a section.
Figure 5 lists the percentage of overhead for processes
Ptr, P, and P, in 3 hours. If the section traversal
time is 1 minute, then the percentages of overhead are
respectively 25.83%, 9.46% and 12.09% for processes
Pt,, P, and P,. The overhead of process Pt,. is larger
than that of processes P, and P, because in each round
the process Pt, performs more communications (and
hence more auxiliary communications) than processes
P, and P, and the communications are synchronized.
From Figure 5, the percentage of overhead decreases
as the section traversal time increases since most of the
time is spent on traversing sections instead of doing
auxiliary communications.
In this implementation, the histories to be sent are
reset t o empty after the auxiliary communications or
the exchanges of histories. A process maint,ains its
own history v h , together with a collection of histories with respect t o every other process in the system.
Whenever there is a communication between processes
P, and Pj, Pi and Pj exchange the histories that contain new events that they have observed since the last
communication between P, and Pj . So processes only
exchange the events which are never sent before. After

the exchange, Pi and PI clean the respective histories.
Thus, the histories t o be sent do not grow as the execution proceeds, nor does the overhead.

6

Summary and Conclusions

This paper presents a formal approach which incorporates formal methods to detect errors and t o guide
fault-finding process for the development of the critical
systems. In this approach, system behavior is specified using a formal logic, ITL. The system behavior
or specification can then be used as a metric t o verify if the run-time behavior of the system satisfies its
expected behavior (specification).
In summary, this approach includes the following
steps.
1. Specify a system using ITL formulas.

2. Collects events and obtains an event history for
each process in the system. This allows a process
to have a (global) view of the execution.
3. Perform evaluation of the ITL formulas according
t o their collected event histories. This is t o detect
an violation of an ITL specification at run-time.

We built a run-time evaluation system using the
formalisms of this paper. The simulation of scaling-up
is underway - check if the overhead of communicating
histories grows proportionally as the number of processes increases. This work will be extended t o enable
evaluation of specifications written in other, suitable,
temporal logic languages. Also, we will consider other
formal languages such as 1 / 0 automata, process algebras or timed CSP for the run-time evaluation system.
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